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Abstract
All standard epistemic logics legitimate something akin to the principle of closure,
according to which knowledge is closed under competent deductive inference. And
yet the principle of closure, particularly in its multiple premise guise, has a somewhat
ambivalent status within epistemology. One might think that serious concerns about
closure point us away from epistemic logic altogether—away from the very idea that
the knowledge relation could be fruitfully treated as a kind of modal operator. This,
however, need not be so. The abandonment of closure may yet leave in place plenty of
formal structure amenable to systematic logical treatment. In this paper we describe
a family of weak epistemic logics in which closure fails, and describe two alternative
semantic frameworks in which these logics can be modelled. One of these—which we
term plurality semantics—is relatively unfamiliar. We explore under what conditions
plurality frames validate certain much-discussed principles of epistemic logic. It turns
out that plurality frames can be interpreted in a very natural way in light of one
motivation for rejecting closure, adding to the significance of our technical work.
The second framework that we employ—neighbourhood semantics—is much better
known. But we show that it too can be interpreted in a way that comports with a certain
motivation for rejecting closure.
Keywords Epistemic logic · Closure · Compartmentalisation · Fragmentation ·
Risk minimisation · Neighbourhood semantics · Plurality semantics
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1 Closure in epistemic logic
The language of epistemic logic is an extension of the language of ordinary propo-
sitional logic with an added operator K , usually read ‘S knows that . . .’, ‘S is in a
position to know that . . .’, ‘S implicitly knows that . . .’, ‘. . . follows from what S
knows’ [see Fagin et al. (1995), Williamson (2000, Sect. 10.4)]. The behaviour of this
operator is generally taken to be governed by one of the normal modal logics and
modelled, using the Kripke semantic framework, as a kind of universal quantifier over
possible worlds. Proposed logics have included KT (Williamson 2000, Sect. 10.4),
S4 (Hintikka 1962), S4.2 (Lenzen 1978; Stalnaker 2006), S4.3 (van der Hoek 1996),
S4.4 (von Kutschera 1976) and S5 (Fagin et al. 1995). Sometimes additional operators
are added in order to represent the knowledge of further agents. We will only consider
single agent systems here, though the logics we describe could certainly be extended
to multiple agent systems. If we interpret K to mean ‘S has justification for believing
that . . .’ or ‘S is in a position to justifiably believe that . . .’, we arrive at a different kind
of epistemic logic—a logic of justification (Rosenkranz 2018; Smith 2018). Though
our primary focus here will be on the logic of knowledge, we will return to the logic
of justification from time to time.
Epistemic closure principles are designed to capture the idea that deduction is
a sure-fire way of extending one’s corpus of knowledge—that drawing deductively
valid inferences can never take us from the realm of knowledge into the realm of pure
guesswork. While this basic idea is undoubtedly attractive, it has proved somewhat
resistant to precise formulation. There are, indeed, a number of subtly different versions
of the closure principle on the market [see, for instance, Kvanvig (2006)]. For the most
part, the issue of selecting the most plausible or defensible version need not concern
us here. The kind of closure principles that are part of epistemic logic are closest to
the formulation used by Cohen (2002, p. 312) (“If S knows P and S knows P entails
Q, then S knows (or at least is in a position to know) Q”) and to the closure principle
(4) in Kvanvig (2006) (“If you know P, and know that P entails Q, then you are in a
position to know Q”).
The first thing to observe when considering the status of closure within epistemic
logic is that the following inference pattern will be admissible in all of the epistemic
logics listed above and, indeed, admissible in any normal epistemic logic.
[MPC] For any positive integer n,
 (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) ⊃ ψ
 (Kφ1 ∧ · · · Kφn) ⊃ Kψ
MPC (for multiple premise closure) states that if (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn) ⊃ ψ is a logical
theorem (if φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn deductively entails ψ) then (Kφ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Kφn) ⊃ Kψ is a
logical theorem (Kφ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Kφn deductively entails Kψ).
We can also set out a weaker single premise version of the principle:1
[SPC]  φ ⊃ ψ
 Kφ ⊃ Kψ
1 On the face of it, the informal characterisations of closure we quoted only suggest this weaker principle.
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SPC states that if φ ⊃ ψ is a logical theorem (if φ deductively entails ψ) then
Kφ ⊃ Kψ is a logical theorem (Kφ deductively entails Kψ).
If K is to be read ‘S knows that . . .’, in line with the first suggestion above, then
these patterns would appear to enshrine closure principles so strong that almost no-one
would be inclined to accept them in full generality. The idea that one automatically
knows the deductive consequences of one’s knowledge is surely unrealistic for all but
the most idealised of agents. Knowledge is generally thought to require belief but, quite
clearly, an ordinary epistemic agent could fail to believe the deductive consequences of
things that she knows—she could simply fail to perform or even consider the relevant
deductions.
If K is given any of the alternative readings noted above (each of which are similar
in spirit) then the principles enshrined by SPC and MPC become altogether more
plausible. If K is read ‘S is in a position to know that . . .’ then what these patterns
require is that one be in a position to know the deductive consequences of things that
one is in a position to know. In other words, the relation of being in a position to know
is closed under the multi-premise/single-premise deductive consequence relation. We
shall adopt this as our official reading of the K operator. To be in a position to know
something, in the relevant sense, it is not enough that one be psychologically capable
of knowing it. Neither is it enough that one could feasibly acquire knowledge by
conducting some investigation or inquiry into the matter. Rather, to be in a position to
know something, the fact must lie open and accessible to one’s mind, such that one
could know it without needing to gather any further evidence [see Williamson (2000,
Sect. 4.2)].
For a time controversy over closure principles focused upon the role that such
principles play in certain well known sceptical arguments [see, for instance, Dretske
(1970), Dretske (2005), Nozick (1981)]. Many ordinary, mundane premises deduc-
tively entail the negations of sceptical hypotheses. But it’s intuitive to think that we
cannot know the negations of sceptical hypotheses in which case, if closure holds, we
cannot know the ordinary mundane premises either. The discussion of these sceptical
arguments has, for the most part, run its course and the prevailing view, we think, is
that resisting scepticism need not ultimately require the abandonment of closure. In
any case, we will focus here upon two rather different concerns about closure, both of
which have been the focus of more recent attention.
The first of these concerns arises against the background of a view on which knowl-
edge requires the minimisation, but not the complete elimination, of falsity risk. It is
often observed that deductive inferences that involve multiple premises can serve to
aggregate the risk of falsity—the conclusion may run a higher falsity risk than any
of the premises taken individually. In particular, the conclusion may run such a high
falsity risk as to preclude one from being in a position to know it, even if none of the
premises do. In Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne puts the point in this way:
Deductive inference from multiple premises aggregates risks. The risk accruing
to one’s belief in each premise may be small enough to be consistent with the
belief having the status of knowledge. But the risks may add up, so that the
deduced belief may be in too great a danger of being false to count as knowledge.
[Hawthorne (2004, p. 47)]
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It’s important to note that the risk aggregation motivation for rejecting closure,
unlike the anti-sceptical motivation, appears to leave the single premise version of the
principle intact. Single premise deductive inferences cannot, after all, aggregate risk in
the same way as multiple premise deductive inferences. In a single premise deductive
inference, the falsity of the conclusion guarantees the falsity of the premise, in which
case the risk that the conclusion is false cannot possibly exceed the risk that the premise
is false. As Hawthorne puts it ‘. . . deductive inference from a single premise does not
seem like a candidate for risky inference. If p entails q then q must be logically weaker
or equivalent to p’ [Hawthorne (2004, p. 47)].2 The risk minimisation theory provides
reason to reject MPC but no reason to reject SPC. If we take risk minimisation to be
necessary for justification then we also have reason to reject MPC on the justification
reading of the K operator.
The second concern about multiple premise closure arises against the background
of a view on which an agent’s body of knowledge is compartmentalised—divided
into autonomous compartments that may not be fully integrated with one another. In
‘Elusive Knowledge’ David Lewis mentions the anti-sceptical motivation for rejecting
closure, which he associates with Dretske, and then continues:
There is another reason, different from Dretske’s, why we might doubt closure.
Suppose two or more premises jointly imply a conclusion. Might not someone
who is compartmentalized in his thinking—as we all are—know each of the
premises but fail to bring them together in a single compartment? Then might he
not fail to know the conclusion? Yes; and I would not like to plea idealization-
of-rationality as an excuse for ignoring such cases. [Lewis (1996, p. 565)]
On this view, it is compartments, rather than agents, that serve as the primary
subjects of potential knowledge. An agent might be said to be in a position to know
something only in a derivative sense—iff one of his or her underlying compartments
is [Lewis (1996, p. 443)].
Closure will fail, on this sort of picture, in so far as compartments can fail to share
their potential knowledge with one another. Just because one compartment is in a
position to know one premise of a deductive inference and another compartment is in
a position to know another, there need not be any compartment that is in a position to
know the conclusion. Like the risk minimisation motivation for rejecting closure, the
compartmentalisation motivation poses no obvious threat to single premise closure.
After all, single premise deductive inferences do not require the integration of potential
knowledge from different compartments. The compartmentalisation theory provides
reason to reject MPC, but no reason to reject SPC. If compartments can fail to share
their potential justification with one another we also have reason to reject MPC on the
justification reading of the K operator.3 Something close to the compartmentalisation
2 For a dissenting view, on which risk aggregation considerations can pose a threat even to single premise
closure, see Lasonen-Aarnio (2008). For discussion of this view, see Smith (2013), Tang (2018).
3 This is certainly the case on the ‘S is in a position to justifiably believe . . .’ reading of the operator.
Just because one compartment is in a position to justifiably believe one premise of a deductive inference
and another compartment is in a position to justifiably believe another, there need not be any compartment
that is in a position to justifiably believe the conclusion. On some views, however, having justification for
believing a proposition does not entail that one is in a position to justifiably believe it—having justification
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motivation for rejecting MPC is noted by Fagin and Halpern (1987), who suggest that
what subjects believe or know is relative to different ‘frames of mind’ that one cannot
occupy simultaneously.4
Lewis says little about what compartments actually are and why we should accept
their existence, and we won’t attempt to elaborate here [for some related discussion
see Lewis (1982), Stalnaker (1984, Chap. 5) Spectre (2018)]. For present purposes,
it is enough that compartments be thought of as partially disjoint bodies of poten-
tial knowledge. Even if one is inclined to doubt that individuals’ minds are divided
into compartments in this way, the foregoing reasoning may still pose a threat to MPC
taken in full generality. As well as attributing knowledge to individuals, we sometimes
describe communities, corporations, nations etc. as ‘knowing’ things.5 Such talk may
be metaphorical—but if we take it literally then there will be subjects of knowledge
that are transparently compartmentalised in just the sense at play here. If a group is in
a position to know something whenever some of its members are, then the potential
knowledge of that group need not be closed under multiple premise deductive conse-
quence. We won’t pursue this further here—though we will have a little more to say
about group knowledge along the way. It is not our aim, in any case, to defend the
rejection of multiple premise closure—our aim is to develop epistemic logics that do
justice to this rejection and to the kinds of perspectives (right or wrong) that might
motivate it.
The MPC inference pattern can, we might observe, be decomposed into the weaker
SPC pattern and the following theorem schema:
(A) (Kφ ∧ Kψ) ⊃ K (φ ∧ ψ)
(A) can be thought of as an agglomeration principle stating that, if one is in a
position to know each conjunct of a conjunction then one is in a position to know the
conjunction. SPC is, evidently, a limiting case of MPC (for which n = 1). Proving
(A) using MPC is very simple: as a tautology, (φ ∧ ψ) ⊃ (φ ∧ ψ) is a theorem, and
by MPC, so is (A). MPC can, in turn, be derived using (A) and SPC.6 (A), in effect,
allows us to collapse multiple premise deductive entailments with known premises,
into single premise deductive entailments with a known premise.
Both the risk minimisation and compartmentalisation theories would appear to
pinpoint (A) as the source of trouble in MPC. It is the conjoining of individually
known premises that can allow falsity risk to aggregate and can require the integra-
tion of potential knowledge from separate compartments. Once all of the premises
are conjoined, no further risk is introduced and no further integration is required by
the deductive transition to a conclusion. Both the risk minimisation and compartmen-
talisation theories motivate the rejection of MPC, via the rejection of (A), and the
Footnote 3 continued
for believing a proposition is compatible with one being blocked, for one reason or another, from exploiting
that justification in forming a justified belief [Smithies (2012, Sect. 4)]. As such, the compartmentalisation
theory may leave some scope for preserving MPC for the ‘S has justification for believing . . .’ reading of
the operator. We won’t pursue this further here.
4 Compartmentalisation may be a feature of theories as well as thinkers; see Brown and Priest (2004), who
allow for a limited aggregation across compartments.
5 See Bird (2014) and Tuomela (2004), for example.
6 See the proof of Theorem 4.3(3) in Chellas (1980, p. 115) (with ‘C’ for our ‘(A)’ and ‘RM’ for our ‘SPC’).
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retention of SPC. Though we will briefly consider some epistemic logics in which
even SPC fails, we are primarily interested in logics that complement this particular
combination of views—in logics that are located “in between” SPC and MPC.
2 Kripke semantics
In developing these logics, we begin by setting things up in a more formal fashion.
Let the language L include, in its vocabulary, countably many sentential constants
(P0, P1, P2, P3, . . .), the verum and falsum constants ( and ⊥), the extensional oper-
ators (∧,∨,∼ and ⊃), the operator K and punctuation. The sentences of L can be built
using the standard recursive clauses for operators and punctuation. We will continue
to use lower case Greek letters as metalinguistic sentence variables and use & , ¬
and → as the extensional operators of the metalanguage.
The following nine principles serve as the building blocks of the most familiar
modal logics:
(K) K (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (Kφ ⊃ Kψ)
(D) Kφ ⊃ ∼K∼φ
(T) Kφ ⊃ φ
(B) ∼K∼Kφ ⊃ φ
(4) Kφ ⊃ K Kφ
(.2) ∼K∼Kφ ⊃ K∼K∼φ
(.3) K (Kφ ⊃ Kψ) ∨ K (Kψ ⊃ Kφ)
(.4) φ ⊃ (∼K∼Kφ ⊃ Kφ)
(5) ∼Kφ ⊃ K∼Kφ
A K-logic includes all truth functional tautologies, all instances of (K), and is
closed under two basic inference rules—modus ponens and what is sometimes called
‘knowledge generalisation’:
[MP]  φ, φ ⊃ ψ
 ψ
[KG]  φ
 Kφ
The minimal K-logic is simply called K. Further K-logics that have been considered
result from adding all instances of some selection (zero or more) of the remaining
principles. The weakest K-logic that might be taken seriously as a potential logic
of knowledge is the logic KT. (T), of course, captures the idea that knowledge is
factive and, as such, one can only be in a position to know truths. If the K operator
is given a justification reading then (T) is no longer appropriate and should, perhaps,
be replaced by (D). This is one significant difference between the logic of knowledge
and the logic of justification. Much of the philosophical literature on epistemic logic
has focussed upon the viability of the remaining principles—particularly the ‘positive
introspection’ or ‘KK’ principle (4) and the ‘negative introspection’ principle (5). If,
of course, concerns about closure are well founded then no K-logic is cut out to serve
as an adequate epistemic logic. With the two inference rules in place, (K) already
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provides everything that we need in order to derive full MPC. Since any instance of
(K) can also be derived using MPC and the other inference rules we could simply
substitute the admissibility of MPC for the presence of the (K) axiom schema.7 That
is, a K-logic could simply be defined as a logic that includes all truth functional
tautologies and admits the rules MP, KG and MPC.
A Kripke frame F is a pair 〈W , R〉 where W is a nonempty set of possible worlds,
and R is a binary relation upon W . A Kripke model M based upon the frame 〈W , R〉 is
a triple 〈W , R, I 〉 where I is a valuation, mapping the non-negative integers to subsets
of W (i.e. mapping i to the set of worlds where the atomic sentence Pi is true in the
model). We define recursively what it is for a sentence φ to be true at a world w in a
Kripke model M—Mw φ:
Mw 

M
w ⊥
Mw Pn iff w ∈ I (n)
Mw φ ∧ ψ iff Mw φ & Mw ψ
Mw ∼φ iff Mw φ
Mw Kφ iff ∀x ∈ W , wRx → Mx φ
According to the Kripke-semantic clause for K , Kφ is true at a world w in a Kripke
model iff R connects w only to worlds at which φ is true.
A sentence φ might be described as valid relative to a Kripke model M = 〈W , R, I 〉
just in case for every w ∈ W Mw φ. In this case we write M φ. A sentence might
be described as valid relative to a Kripke frame F = 〈W , R〉 just in case it is valid
relative to any model based upon that frame. In this case we write F φ. Finally, a
sentence might be described as valid relative to a class of Kripke frames just in case
it is valid with respect to every frame in the class.
The relation R that features in the clause for K can be interpreted in a range of
different ways. At a minimum, what it means for world w1 to stand in relation R to
world w2 (w1 Rw2) is for w2 to be consistent with everything that S is in a position
to know at w1—just in case, for all that S is in a position to know at w1, she may be
at w2. Understanding R in this way will, of course, render the clause for K viciously
circular, if considered as a putative analysis of knowledge—on this interpretation,
what the clause says is that S is in a position to know a sentence φ at a world w
iff φ is true at all worlds that are consistent with what S is in a position to know at
w. But the clause need not be intended as part of a philosophical analysis. Rather, it
provides us with a new way of representing information about what S is in a position
to know—representing it in terms of a binary relation on worlds.
As is well known, the logic K is determined by the class of Kripke frames. That is,
a sentence is a theorem of K iff it is valid in all Kripke frames. By placing constraints
upon the relation R, we can limit the class of permissible frames and determine various
stronger logics. Each of the optional principles listed above corresponds to a distinctive
constraint upon R:
7 For details, see the proof of Theorem 4.3(1) in Chellas (1980, p. 115) (‘KG’ corresponds to ‘RN’, and
‘MPC’ to ‘RK’).
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Principle Constraint 〈W, R〉 is . . .
(D) ∀x ∈ W , ∃y, x Ry serial
(T) ∀x ∈ W , x Rx reflexive
(B) ∀x, y ∈ W , x Ry → y Rx symmetric
(4) ∀x, y, z ∈ W , (x Ry & y Rz) → x Rz transitive
(.2) ∀x, y, z ∈ W , (x Ry & x Rz) → ∃v(y Rv & z Rv) convergent
(.3) ∀x, y, z ∈ W , (x Ry & x Rz) → (y Rz ∨ z Ry) connected
(.4) ∀x, y, z ∈ W , (x Ry & x = y & x Rz) → z Ry triangular
(5) ∀x, y, z ∈ W , (x Ry & x Rz) → z Ry Euclidean
The logics that result from combining any of these optional principles will be
determined by the class of Kripke frames meeting the corresponding constraints.
Given the understanding of R set out above, the content of at least some of these
constraints can be made apparent. Reflexivity, for instance, enforces the idea that a
world w is always consistent with what S is in a position to know at w. Symmetry
requires that if w2 is consistent with everything that S is in a position to know at w1
then w1 must be consistent with everything that S is in a position to know at w2.
Transitivity requires that, if w3 is consistent with everything that S is in a position to
know at w2 but not consistent with everything that S is in a position to know at w1 then
w2 is not consistent with everything that S is in a position to know at w1. In effect, if
the potential knowledge that S possesses at w2 is, in some respect, weaker than the
potential knowledge that S possesses at w1, then w2 is inconsistent with the potential
knowledge that S possesses at w1.
The Euclidean constraint requires that if w3 is consistent with everything that S
is in a position to know at w1, and w3 is not consistent with everything that S is
in a position to know at w2 then w2 is not consistent with everything that S is in a
position to know at w1. In effect, if the potential knowledge that S possesses at w2
is, in some respect, stronger than the potential knowledge that S possesses at w1,
then w2 is inconsistent with the potential knowledge that S possesses at w1. If we
impose a Euclidean constraint, in addition to a reflexivity constraint, then R will be
an equivalence relation—it will serve to partition W into sets of worlds that all stand
in relation R to one another, but to no worlds outside of the set. This would appear to
capture the idea that we have a kind of privileged ‘introspective’ access to our own
potential knowledge—the worlds that will be consistent with S’s potential knowledge
at w will be just those at which S possesses exactly the same potential knowledge.
Kripke semantics, so understood, provides us with an additional resource when
it comes to evaluating the plausibility of the eight optional principles. Provided one
takes the Kripke-semantic clause for K to be appropriate, the plausibility or otherwise
of any of these principles will be tethered to the plausibility of the corresponding
constraint which may, in some cases, be easier to evaluate. This, surely, is one of the
most tangible benefits of an adequate semantic framework—it can provide us with
an independent ‘entry point’ into evaluating the plausibility of various logics. Our
primary concern here, of course, is not with the plausibility of any of the optional
principles but, rather, with the plausibility of (K) itself. And, when it comes to this
question, the Kripke semantic framework effectively falls silent—whatever semantic
assumptions (K) embodies are, in some way, smuggled into the very framework itself.
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3 Generalising Kripke semantics
In order to understand the semantic assumptions underlying (K), we require a more
general framework—a framework relative to which (K) itself stands as an optional
principle. One such framework is provided by what is sometimes called minimal or
neighbourhood semantics.8 Let a neighbourhood frame F be a pair 〈W , N 〉 where W ,
as before, is a nonempty set of possible worlds and N is a function assigning to each
w ∈ W a set of sets of elements of W . The elements of N (w) are sometimes termed
the ‘neighbourhoods’ around w. A neighbourhood model M based upon the frame
〈W , N 〉 is a triple 〈W , N , I 〉 where I , as before, is a mapping from non-negative
integers to subsets of W . What it is for a sentence φ to be true at a world w in a
neighbourhood model (Mw φ) is defined by recycling the recursive clauses listed
above, with the exception of the clause for ‘K ’ which now reads:
Mw Kφ iff {w ∈ W :Mw φ} ∈ N (w)
According to this clause, Kφ is true at a world w in a neighbourhood model iff the
set of worlds at which φ is true is one of the neighbourhoods around w.
A sentence φ might be described as valid in a neighbourhood model M =
〈W , N , I 〉 just in case for every w ∈ W Mw φ. In this case we write M φ. A
sentence φ might be described as valid in a neighbourhood frame F = 〈W , N 〉 just in
case it is valid relative to any model based on that frame. In this case we write F φ.
Finally, a sentence might be described as valid relative to a class of neighbourhood
frames just in case it is valid with respect to every frame in the class.
SPC does not preserve validity in all neighbourhood models. Consider a neighbour-
hood model M = 〈W , N , I 〉. Suppose W consists of just two worlds w1 and w2 such
that N (w1) = {{w1}, {w2}}. Suppose that the assignment ensures that P0 is true and
P1 is true at w1, and P0 false and P1 true at w2. P0 ⊃ P1 is valid in M. Given the
new clause for K , however, it follows that K P0 is true at w1 while K P1 is not.
Say that a neighbourhood frame is supplemented iff the set of neighbourhoods
around a world is closed under the superset relation—that is, a neighbourhood frame
F = 〈W , N 〉 is supplemented iff ∀x ∈ W ,∀ ∈ N (x), ⊆  →  ∈ N (x). SPC
does preserve validity in any supplemented neighbourhood frame. Suppose φ ⊃ ψ is
valid in a supplemented neighbourhood model M = 〈W , N , I 〉, and that Kφ holds
at some world w ∈ W . It follows, given the clause for K , that the set of worlds  at
which φ is true is an element of N (w). Since φ ⊃ ψ holds at every world in W , the set
of worlds  at which ψ is true must be a superset of . Since M is a supplemented
model,  must be an element of N (w) in which case, given the semantic clause for
K , Kψ is true at w. Thus, Kφ ⊃ Kψ holds at every world in W and is valid in M.
(K), however, is not valid in all supplemented neighbourhood frames. Consider a
neighbourhood model M = 〈W , N , I 〉. Suppose W consists of just two worlds w1
and w2 such that N (w1) = {{w1}, {w2}, W }. M clearly meets the conditions for a
supplemented neighbourhood model. Suppose the valuation ensures that P0 is true
and P1 false at w1 and P0 and P1 are both false at w2. Given the recursive clause for
K , it follows straightforwardly that K (P0 ⊃ P1) and K P0 hold at w1 but K P1 does
8 For a detailed discussion of this framework, see Chellas (1980, Ch. 7) or Pacuit (2017).
123
Synthese
not. For a simple countermodel to (A) suppose that P0 is true and P1 is false at w1
and P1 is true and P0 is false at w2. In this case K (P0 ∧ P1) will be false at w1 while
K (P0) and K (P1) will both be true. This example also serves to show that MPC does
not preserve validity in all supplemented neighbourhood frames.
Say that a neighbourhood frame F = 〈W , N 〉 satisfies closure under (finite) inter-
sections iff∀x ∈ W ,∀, ∈ N (x),∩ ∈ N (x). (A) is valid in any neighbourhood
frame that satisfies that condition. Consider a neighbourhood model M = 〈W , N , I 〉
that satisfies closure under intersections. Suppose that Kφ and Kψ are true at some
world w ∈ W . It follows, given the recursive clause for K , that the set of worlds  at
which φ is true is an element of N (w) and the set of worlds  at which ψ is true is an
element of N (w). Since M satisfies closure under intersections,  ∩  must be an
element of N (w). Since  ∩  is the set of worlds at which φ ∧ ψ is true, it follows,
given the semantic clause for K , that K (φ ∧ ψ) is true at w. Since (A) is valid in
any neighbourhood frame that satisfies closure under intersections and SPC preserves
validity in any supplemented neighbourhood frame, it follows that (K) is valid in all
supplemented neighbourhood frames that satisfy closure under intersections.
Say that a neighbourhood frame F = 〈W , N 〉 satisfies full closure under inter-
sections iff ∀x ∈ W ,∀ ⊆ N (x),⋂ ∈ N (w). Closure under finite intersections
guarantees full closure under intersections provided that N (w) is non-empty and finite
for any w ∈ W . Supplemented neighbourhood frames that satisfy full closure under
intersections are, in effect, thinly veiled Kripke frames. If N (w) is fully closed under
intersections and closed under the superset relation then
⋂
N (w) will be a member of
N (w) and, furthermore,  ∈ N (w) iff  ⊇ ⋂ N (w). The neighbourhood-semantic
clause for K could then be rewritten:
Mw Kφ iff {w ∈ W :Mw φ} ⊇
⋂
N (w)
Finally, if we define a binary relation R as follows: w1 Rw2 iff w2 ∈ ⋂ N (w1), we
are back to the Kripke-semantic clause for K .
One complaint that is sometimes made against neighbourhood semantics is that,
in constrast to Kripke semantics, it strikes one as almost empty or contrived (Sylvan
1989). The complaint is difficult to make precise, but also difficult to completely ignore,
particularly if the function N is left unexplained. With N unexplained, neighbourhood
semantics may provide a way of modelling a range of weak epistemic logics—but it
would not provide any independent way of evaluating the plausibility of such logics.
In the present setting, though, a more substantial interpretation of N may be available.
As discussed in Sect. 1, one powerful motivation for rejecting multiple premise
closure for knowledge springs from the idea that knowledge should require only the
minimisation, and not the complete elimination, of falsity risk. To make sense of this
idea, we need some notion of epistemic probability on which being in a position to
know something is compatible with its negation having an epistemic probability that is
greater than 0.9 Let Prw be a probability function, defined over a field Fw of subsets of
9 In an infinite probability space a proposition may have a probability of 1 (and its negation a probability
of 0), even though it is false at some worlds in the space. We can imagine a view on which being in a
position to know something requires that its negation have an epistemic probability of 0, but is compatible
with its negation being true in some epistemically possible worlds. This could be classed as a kind of ‘risk
minimisation’ view, albeit one which won’t pose a threat to multiple premise closure.
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W —that is, a set of subsets of W that includes W itself and is closed under intersection
and complementation in W . If  is a set in Fw, let Prw() be taken to represent the
epistemic probability, for S at w, that she is located at one of the worlds in .
With this machinery in place, N (w) might be interpreted as the set of sets of worlds
in Fw that are reckoned to be sufficiently probable by Prw: N (w) = { ∈ Fw :
Prw() > t & C()}, where t is a threshold close to, but less than, 1, and C is a
placeholder for any further constraints that we wish the members of N (w) satisfy. On
this interpretation, what the neighbourhood semantic clause for K says is that S is in
a position to know a sentence φ at a world w only if the set of worlds at which φ is
true satisfies condition C and has an epistemic probability, for S at w, that exceeds a
threshold t , for some t that is close to but less than 1. As such, the semantic clause
would appear to capture the central claim of the risk-minimisation theory—namely,
that being in a position to know something requires the minimisation of falsity risk
(Kyburg and Teng 2002). Other requirements on knowledge can be captured by the
free constraint C . If, for instance, knowledge is required to be factive so that one can
only know truths, then we should require that N (w) only include sets that contain
w. If we were modelling a logic of justification, rather than knowledge, no such
constraint would not be needed, and it may be possible to interpret N (w) as including
all sufficiently probable sets of worlds, allowing C to lapse altogether. Even if we
impose no additional constraints, this semantic framework can give rise to several
different logics for the K -operators, depending on where we set the threshold t .10
All of these logics will be stronger than the weak logic that we call EMN, following
(Chellas 1980), and that we will formally define at the beginning of Sect. 5.11
Notice that if Prw() > t and  ⊆ , it follows that Prw() > t . As such,
N (w), on the present interpretation, will be closed under the superset relation, on the
assumption that any further constraint C is similarly closed. Unless tempted by further
closure-violating conditions upon knowledge, risk minimisation theorists who accept
the present interpretation of N should countenance only supplemented neighbourhood
frames. This is as it should be—as discussed in the last section, risk minimisation
theorists have no motivation to reject SPC. As noted above, if we relax the supple-
mentation requirement, neighbourhood semantics can be used to model epistemic
logics in which even SPC fails. Perhaps it is possible to interpret unsupplemented
neighbourhood frames in a way that comports with the anti-sceptical motivation for
rejecting SPC—but we won’t explore this here.
10 If the threshold t is set at 0.5 or higher then any two members of N (w) must overlap (have a nonempty
intersection)—a constraint which will validate (D). Higher values for t will yield further constraints—
if, for instance, t is set at 23 or above, it will turn out that any three members of N (w) must have a
nonempty intersection. In general, for any n, the constraint that any n members of N (w) must have a
nonempty intersection will be yielded by a threshold of n−1n or higher. All such constraints will of course
be guaranteed by the (T)-validating constraint that every member of N (w) contain w—and every one of
these constraints will serve to validate a principle intermediate in strength between (D) and (T). We won’t
pursue this further here.
11 Kyburg and Teng (2002) may be read as endorsing EMN as a logic for a knowledge operator, appealing
to a kind of unadorned risk minimisation conception of knowledge. Despite the way Kyburg and Teng
present things, the failure of factivity makes it difficult to take EMN seriously as a logic of knowledge. It
may have more promise as a logic of justification but, partly for reasons explored in the previous footnote,
is arguably too weak even for this purpose.
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On the present interpretation, N (w) will not, in general, be closed under
intersections—Prw() > t and Prw() > t are compatible with Prw( ∩ ) ≤ t ,
for any t < 1. The requirement that N (w) be closed under intersections should be
understood, on the present interpretation, as the requirement that t be set at 1. As dis-
cussed, it is this requirement that will, in effect, take us back into the realm of Kripke
semantics, normal epistemic logics and MPC. Kripke semantics can be portrayed,
then, as a limiting case of the present semantics, applicable when knowledge requires
epistemic certainty—the complete elimination, and not merely the minimisation, of
error risk.
Neighbourhood semantics seems a good fit with a risk minimisation picture of
knowledge—there is something inherent within the risk minimisation picture that N
could be taken to represent.12 But for those who are motivated to abandon MPC for
reasons of compartmentalisation, rather than reasons of risk minimisation, neighbour-
hood semantics seems a less natural choice. There is nothing, or nothing obvious,
within the compartmentalisation picture, that the function N could be taken to repre-
sent. While neighbourhood semantics can be used to model the weak epistemic logics
to which a compartmentalisation theorist may be attracted, such a theorist should not
regard it as much more than a convenient technical device for doing so.
For those attracted to the compartmentalisation picture, we suggest an alternative
semantic approach that is much less familiar but is mentioned in Chellas (1980, pp.
74–75) and developed further in Milne (1993).13 As it lacks a standard name, we term
it plurality semantics. Let a plurality frame F be a pair 〈W ,R〉, where W is, as always,
a nonempty set of possible worlds and R is a non-empty set of binary relations on W.
A plurality model M based upon the frame 〈W ,R〉 is a triple 〈W ,R, I 〉, where I , as
before, is a mapping from nonnegative integers to subsets of W . Truth at a world in a
plurality model (Mw φ) is defined using the same recursive clauses for the extensional
operators and the following modification of the Kripke-semantic clause for K :
Mw Kφ iff ∃R ∈ R, ∀x ∈ W , wRx → Mx φ
Acording to this clause, Kφ is true at a world w in a plurality model iff there is a
relation R in R that connects w only to worlds at which φ is true.14
A sentence φ might be described as valid relative to a plurality model M =
〈W ,R, I 〉 just in case for every w ∈ W Mw φ. In this case we write M φ. A
sentence φ might be described as valid relative to a plurality frame F = 〈W ,R〉 just
in case it is valid relative to every model based on that frame. In this case we write
12 Williamson (2015) discusses epistemic logics for knowledge and for justified belief in which multiple
premise closure fails, pointing out the connection with a risk minimisation conception of such notions.
He notes that these logics can be modelled using neighbourhood semantics, but does not discuss how the
semantics should be interpreted in the present setting.
13 A semantic framework that is motivated by similar considerations, but differs in the implementation,
is presented in Schotch and Jennings (1981a, b). See also the discussion of multi-relational frames in
Humberstone (2015, pp. 245–47). This semantic framework also bears a close relation to that set out in
Fagin and Halpern (1987, Sect. 6). While plurality semantics works with relations, theirs is a modification
of neighbourhood semantics that works, in effect, with the sets of worlds accessible from those relations.
14 If there are finitely many relations {R1, . . . , Rn} in R, and if there are corresponding normal operators
Ki in the object language, Kφ can be equivalently defined as K1φ ∨ · · · ∨ Knφ.
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F φ. Finally, a sentence might be described as valid relative to a class of plurality
frames just in case it is valid with respect to every frame in the class.
That (K) is not valid in all plurality frames is easily demonstrated. Consider a
plurality model M = 〈W ,R, I 〉. Suppose W consists of just three worlds w1, w2
and w3 and R contains just two relations R and R′ with just the following instances:
w1 Rw2 and w1 R′w3. Suppose finally that the valuation ensures that P0 is true and P1
is false at w2 and P0 and P1 are both false at w3. Given the new recursive clause for
K it follows straightforwardly that K (P0 ⊃ P1) and K P0 hold at w1 but K P1 does
not. For a simple countermodel to (A) suppose that the assignment ensures that P0 is
true and P1 is false at w2 and P1 is true and P0 is false at w3. In this case K (P0 ∧ P1)
will be false at w1 while K (P0) and K (P1) will both be true. MPC does not preserve
validity in every plurality frame.
SPC, however, will preserve validity in every plurality frame. Suppose φ ⊃ ψ is
valid in a plurality model M = 〈W ,R, I 〉. Suppose that Kφ holds at some world
w ∈ W . It follows, given the recursive clause for K , that there is some relation R ∈ R
such that φ is true at every world to which w is connected via R. Since φ ⊃ ψ holds at
every world in W it follows, further, that ψ is true at every world that w accesses via
R in which case, given the semantic clause for K , Kψ is true at w. Thus, Kφ ⊃ Kψ
holds at every world in W and is valid in 〈W ,R, I 〉.
Likewise, KG will preserve validity in every plurality frame. Suppose φ is valid in
a plurality model M = 〈W ,R, I 〉, and pick w ∈ W . Since R is non-empty, there is
R ∈ R. Since φ is true at every world in the model, it is true at every world that w
accesses via R. Hence, given the semantic clause for K , Kφ is true at w. Since w was
arbitrary, Kφ is valid.
Kripke models can be portrayed as a subclass of plurality models—namely, those
in which R contains but a single relation. In this case, the plurality-semantic clause for
K will simply turn out to be a verbose rephrasing of the Kripke-semantic clause—the
two will clearly output the same values when R = {R}. Call the following constraint
uniqueness:
∃R ∈ R, ∀R′ ∈ R, R = R′
Uniqueness is the constraint that reduces a plurality model, in effect, to a Kripke
model. As such, uniqueness is a semantic constraint that guarantees the validity of
(A) and (K) within plurality semantics. As will be demonstrated, it is not the weakest
semantic constraint to do so.
In the Kripke semantics for epistemic logic, the relation R was understood as
encoding information about consistency with an agent’s potential knowledge at various
possible worlds—what it means for world w1 to stand in relation R to world w2 is that
w2 is consistent with what S is in a position to know atw1. On the compartmentalisation
picture, the intended interpretation of the relations in R seems clear enough—each
will encode information about consistency with the potential knowledge of a particular
compartment at various possible worlds. Recall that compartments can be interpreted,
at a minimum, as repositories of potential knowledge. On this interpretation, what the
plurality-semantic clause for K says is that S is in a position to know a sentence φ at a
world w iff at least one of S’s underlying compartments is such that φ is true at every
world that is consistent with what it is in a position to know at w. In this case, the
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plurality-semantic clause for K captures the central claim of the compartmentalisation
picture—that an individual counts as being in a position to know something iff one
of his underlying compartments does. If we are dealing with the knowledge of a
group, rather than a compartmentalised individual, then each of the relations in R will
encode information about consistency with the potential knowledge of a given member
at various possible worlds, and the plurality-semantic clause for K will capture the
claim that a group counts as being in a position to know something whenever one of
its members does.
The requirement that R contain but a single relation should be understood, on
the present interpretation, as the requirement that an agent have only one underlying
compartment or a group have only one member. This, as discussed, is a requirement
that will take us back into the realm of Kripke semantics and normal epistemic logics.
Kripke semantics can be portrayed, then, as a limiting case of the present semantics,
applicable to non-compartmentalised agents and exclusive groups.
4 Comparing neighbourhood semantics and plurality semantics
We have seen that Kripke semantics can be portrayed as a limiting case of either
neighbourhood semantics or plurality semantics. It remains to clarify the relationship
between the latter two.
There is a good sense in which neighbourhood semantics is more general. If a
sentence is valid in every neighbourhood frame, it is valid in every plurality frame,
as will be shown below. However, the converse does not hold: Kφ ⊃ K (φ ∨ ψ) is
valid in every plurality frame, but not in every neighbourhood frame. Furthermore,
K is not valid in a neighbourhood frame in which N (w) is empty for some w, but
our requirement that R be non-empty ensures that it is valid in every plurality frame.
There is, however, a certain correspondence between the class of plurality frames
and the class of supplemented neighbourhood frames that contain the unit, i.e. are
such that W ∈ N (w) for all w ∈ W . These two classes are equivalent in the sense
that exactly the same sentences of L are valid in them. In fact, there is an even tighter
correspondence. Say that F = 〈W , N 〉 and F ′ = 〈W ′,R〉 are point-wise equivalent
if W = W ′ and for all valuations I , Mw φ iff M′w φ for all φ ∈ L and all w ∈ W
(where M = 〈W , N , I 〉 and M′ = 〈W ,R, I 〉).
Let ()∗ be a function that maps a plurality frame F = 〈W ,R〉 to the neighbourhood
frame defined as follows:
F∗ = 〈W , N 〉, with N (w) := {X : ∃R ∈ R(∀v(wRv → v ∈ X))}
We can then show the following:
Theorem 4.1 For every plurality frame F , F∗ is supplemented, contains the unit, and
is point-wise equivalent to F .
Proof Suppose that X ∈ N (w), and that X ⊆ Y . There is R ∈ R such that v ∈ X
whenever wRv. Since X ⊆ Y , v ∈ Y whenever wRv. Hence Y ∈ N (w), which
shows that F∗ is supplemented. Since R is non-empty, there is R such that v ∈ W
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whenever wRv. Hence W ∈ N (w), and F∗ contains the unit. Given a valuation, a
straightforward induction on the complexity of L-sentences shows that truth-values
in the resulting models agree. unionsq
For the converse result, define a function ()+ that maps a neighbourhood frame F
= 〈W , N 〉 to the following plurality frame:15
F+ = 〈W , {RX : ∃w ∈ W (X ∈ N (w))}〉,
where the relation RX relates w to each world in RX (w), defined by
RX (w) =
{
X if X ∈ N (w)
W otherwise
Theorem 4.2 For every supplemented neighbourhood frame F that contains the unit,
F+ is a point-wise equivalent plurality frame.
Proof We fix a valuation I to obtain models M and M+. Define [φ] = {x :Mx φ}.
We use induction on the complexity of formulas.
Suppose Mw φ. The argument is straightforward for the cases where φ is atomic,
or a negation, or a conjunction. So assume Mw Kψ . Then [ψ] ∈ N (w), and hence
R[ψ] ∈ R+ and R[ψ](w) = [ψ]. Pick v such that wR[ψ]v. Then v ∈ [ψ], and by the
induction hypothesis, M+v ψ , and hence M
+
w Kψ .
For the other direction, suppose M+w φ. We can again focus on the case where
φ = Kψ . Then for some v and some X with X ∈ N (v), M+u ψ for every u ∈ RX (w).
Fix such v and X . Case (i): X ∈ N (w). Then RX (w) = X , and by the induction
hypothesis, Mu ψ for every u ∈ X . Since M is supplemented, Mw Kψ . Case (ii):
X /∈ N (w). Then RX (w) = W . By the induction hypothesis, Mu ψ for every u ∈ W .
Since M contains the unit, W ∈ N (w), and hence Mw Kψ . unionsq
In general, there will be more than one plurality frame that is point-wise equivalent
to a given supplemented neighbourhood frame that contains the unit. The construction
used above only gives one example. We may note that adding relations that are weaker
than others already in a plurality frame produces a point-wise equivalent frame—
where a relation is weaker than another iff the obtaining by the former is entailed by
the obtaining of the latter. More precisely, if for every world w, there is a relation
R′ ∈ R such that wRv whenever wR′v, then 〈W ,R∪{R}〉 is pointwise equivalent to
〈W ,R〉. This is a consequence of the evaluation clause for K : adding further relations
never falsifies a true claim of the form Kφ, while adding a weaker relation never
verifies a claim of the form Kφ that was not already verified by another relation.
There is thus a sense in which plurality frames have surplus structure: they have
more structure than is needed to evaluate the formulas of our languageL. In this respect,
neighbourhood semantics is superior. On the other hand, plurality semantics is, in our
view, more natural and intuitive, especially for those of us who are accustomed to
15 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this definition.
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thinking of modal operators in terms of accessibility relations and of modal principles
in terms of structural constraints upon them.
As a consequence of the correspondence between plurality models and supple-
mented neighbourhood models that contain the unit, many technical results about
plurality semantics can be obtained as corollaries to results about neighbourhood
semantics.
Definition 4.1 Condition C ′ on plurality frames is a pluralisation of condition C on
neighbourhood frames just in case for every plurality frame F , F∗ satisfies condition
C iff F satisfies C ′.
If C ′ is a trivial condition on a plurality frame—being satisfied by all of them—then
C ′ is a pluralisation of the condition of both being supplemented and containing the
unit.
Theorem 4.3 If system S is determined by the class of neighbourhood frames satisfying
condition C, and C ′ is a pluralisation of C, then S is also determined by the class of
plurality frames satisfying C ′.
Proof Let F be a plurality frame satisfying C ′. Given that C ′ is a pluralisation of C ,
F∗ satisfies C . By the soundness result for C-frames, every theorem of S is valid in
F∗. Since F and F∗ are point-wise equivalent (Theorem 4.1), every theorem of S is
valid in F . Hence S is sound for frames satisfying condition C ′.
Suppose now that φ is not a theorem of S. By the completeness result for C-frames,
φ fails in some model N based on a frame F ′ satisfying C . Then there is a plurality
frame F such that F∗ = F ′, namely, F = F ′+. (It is easily verified that in general,
F+∗ = F .) Since the frames are point-wise equivalent, φ fails in model M based on
F , with the same valuation as N . Since F satisfies C ′, S is complete for the class of
plurality frames satisfying C ′. unionsq
Before we can exploit this result, some book-keeping is needed. We noted in Sect. 2
that a K-logic could be defined as a set of L-sentences that includes all truth func-
tional tautologies and admits the rules MP, KG and MPC. Let a EMN-logic be a
set of L-sentences that includes all truth-functional tautologies, and admits the rules
MP, KG, and SPC. The minimal EMN-logic is simply called EMN. We shall use
EMNX1 . . . Xn to refer to the smallest EMN-logic that includes all instances of the
principles X1, . . . , Xn , taken from the list given in Sect. 2. The symbol S is used as a
variable ranging over EMN-logics. As usual, the turnstile symbolizes theoremhood:
S φ iff φ ∈ S.
The system EMN is determined by the class of supplemented neighbourhood
frames that contain the unit [Chellas (1980, pp. 258–259)]. Given Theorem 4.3 and
the above observation that the trivial condition is a pluralisation of the condition of
being supplemented and containing the unit, we get:
Theorem 4.4 EMN is determined by the class of all plurality frames.
We can also prove this result directly, without relying on the textbook result about
neighbourhood models. Doing so will pay dividends later in the paper, when we prove
determination results with respect to certain classes of plurality frames.
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It is routine to verify that EMN is sound with respect to the class of all plurality
frames. For the completeness part, we use a construction of canonical models devised
by Milne (1993) that will be useful for further results too.
For a system S, say that a set of sentences  ⊆ L is S-consistent if there are no
φ1, . . . φn ∈  such that S ∼(φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn). A set of sentences is S-maximal if it is
S-consistent and has no S-consistent proper extensions. According to Lindenbaum’s
Lemma—a standard result that we shall not prove, and appeal to which shall remain
tacit—every S-consistent sentences belongs to an S-maximal set.
Definition 4.2 If S is a EMN-logic, define the canonical model MS = 〈WS,RS, IS〉
as follows:
1. WS = {w : w a S-maximal set of sentences}.
2. RS = {Rφ : φ ∈ L}, where Rφ = {〈w, v〉 : w, v ∈ WS and Kφ /∈ w or φ ∈ v}.
3. IS(i) = {w : w ∈ WS and Pi ∈ w}.
It is clear that MS so-defined is a plurality model. We shall now prove that the
construction has the fundamental feature we expect a canonical model to have: that a
sentence is true at a world just in case it is a member of this world:
Theorem 4.5 If M = 〈W ,R, P〉 is the canonical model of a EMN-logic S, then for
every w ∈ W , φ ∈ w iff Mw φ.
Proof By induction on the complexity of φ. If φ = Pi , then φ ∈ w iff w ∈ PS(i) (by
Definition 4.2.3) iff Mw Pi (by the evaluation clause for atomic sentences).
The induction steps for the usual propositional connectives are straightforward.
Now suppose Kφ ∈ w. Then for every v in WS , wRφv iff φ ∈ v (by Defini-
tion 4.2.2). By the induction hypothesis, MSv φ for every v with wRφv. By the
evaluation clause for K , MSw Kφ.
For the other direction, suppose that Kφ /∈ w. We need to show that for every
ψ ∈ L, ∃v with wRψv and MSv φ. Fix ψ ∈ L. Case (i): Kψ /∈ w. Then wRψv for
all v ∈ W . Now since Kφ /∈ w, S Kφ, and since S admits KG, S φ. Hence ¬φ
is consistent, and there is a maximal v ∈ WS with ¬φ ∈ v. It follows that φ /∈ v,
and by the induction hypothesis, MSv φ. Case (ii): Kψ ∈ w. Then wRψv iff ψ ∈ v.
Suppose that φ ∈ w for all v with wRψv. Then there is no maximal set v with ψ ∈ v
and φ /∈ v. Hence S ψ ⊃ φ. By SPC, S Kψ ⊃ Kφ. Hence Kφ ∈ w, contradicting
the assumption that Kφ /∈ w. Thus it is not the case that φ ∈ v for all v with wRψv.
Hence wRv for some v with MSw φ for every R ∈ RS . unionsq
For the completeness part of Theorem 4.4, suppose  ¬φ. Then there is a EMN-
maximal set of sentences w such that φ ∈ w. By Theorem 4.5, Mw φ for the canonical
model of EMN. Hence φ is satisfiable in the class of plurality models.
In the rest of the paper, we shall look at various extensions of the base system
EMN. Schema (A), introduced earlier, captures the idea that knowledge is closed
under conjunction:
(A) (Kφ ∧ Kψ) ⊃ K (φ ∧ ψ)
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The system EMNA, that is, the smallest EMN-logic that includes all instances of
(A), is just the familiar system K, the smallest normal modal logic, which is determined
by the class of all Kripke frames. Typically, K is characterised as the smallest system
that admits MP, KG and contains all tautologies and all instances of (K):
(K) K (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (Kφ ⊃ Kψ)
Consider frames that satisfy the constraint that we called uniqueness—i.e. that are
such that R = {R} for some R. Clearly, there is a validity-preserving one-to-one
correspondence from such plurality frames to Kripke frames. Since K is determined
by the class of all Kripke frames, it is also determined by the class of plurality frames
satisfying the uniquness constraint. However, this leaves open the question whether
K is also determined by a different class of plurality frames.
Say thatF = 〈W ,R〉 is sub-closed if for allw ∈ W and R, R′ ∈ R, there is R′′ ∈ R
such that for all v, wR′′v only if both wRv and wR′v. If a frame has only finitely
many relations in R, it is sub-closed only if there is a “know-it-all” compartment; that
is, a compartment that is in a position to know a sentence if any is.
Theorem 4.6 (A) is defined by the class of sub-closed plurality frames.
Proof To show that (A) is valid in every sub-closed plurality frame, suppose that
Mw Kφ and Mw Kψ . Then ∃R, R′ ∈ R such that Mv φ for all v with wRv and
Mu ψ for all u with wR′u. Since R is sub-closed, there is R′′ ∈ R such that for all
v, wR′′v only if both wRv and wR′v. Hence both Mv φ and Mv ψ for all v with
wR′′v, and hence Mw K (φ ∧ ψ). It follows that Mw (Kφ ∧ Kψ) ⊃ K (φ ∧ ψ).
It remains to show that every plurality frame that is not sub-closed is the basis
of a model in which (A) fails. Suppose that for some w, R, and R′, there is no R′′
such that wR′′v only if both wRv and wR′v. Then there is a model M on this frame
with I (0) = {v : wRv}, and I (1) = {v : wR′v}. Then Mw K P0 and Mw K P1 but

M
w K (P0 ∧ P1), falsifying an instance of (A). unionsq
It follows immediately that EMNA is sound for the class of sub-closed plurality
frames. To obtain the matching completeness result, note that a plurality frame that
satisfies the uniqueness constraint is trivially sub-closed: for if R = {R}, then for all
R′, R′′ ∈ R, R ∩ R′ = R, and there is R∗ ∈ R such that R∗ ⊆ R—R itself. Since
K is complete for the class of plurality frames with only one relation, it is a fortiori
complete for the class of sub-closed plurality frames. Hence we have proved (modulo
the completeness proof relative to Kripke frames, which is not given here):
Theorem 4.7 EMNA is determined by the class of sub-closed plurality frames.
In the following, we shall use some of the terms that characterise relations in an
extended sense, to characterise classes of relations. So we shall say that R is reflexive
iff every R ∈ R is, and that R is transitive if every R ∈ R is, and likewise for the
other terms used in the table in Sect. 2.
Theorem 4.8 EMNT is determined by the class of reflexive plurality frames.
Proof For soundness, suppose that Mw Kφ. Then there is R ∈ R such that Mw′ φ for
all w′ such that wRw′. Since R is reflexive, wRw. Hence Mw φ and Mw Kφ ⊃ φ.
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For completeness, we verify that the canonical model is reflexive. That is, we show
that for Rφ ∈ REMNT, either Kφ /∈ w or φ ∈ w. Suppose that the former is false.
Then Kφ ∈ w. Since Kφ ⊃ φ ∈ EMNT, Kφ ⊃ φ ∈ w. Since w is closed under MP,
φ ∈ w. unionsq
Abstracting from the deductive base provided by the system EMN, we can also
obtain a direct correspondence result between (T) and the condition of reflexivity: (T)
defines reflexivity, in the sense that it is valid on all reflexive frames, and invalid on all
frames that fail to be reflexive. Validity on all reflexive frames follows from the above
soundness proof. If M is not reflexive, then there are w, R such that w does not bear
R to itself. If I (0) = W \ {w}, then Mw K P0 ⊃ P0.
In the next two sections, we will continue to try to develop an autonomous theory
of plurality models, rather than transferring results via Theorem 4.3.
5 EMN4 and transitivity
In light of the determination result for EMNT, it is tempting to conjecture that if
KX1 . . . Xn is determined by the class of Kripke frames in which R satisfies constraints
k(X1) to k(Xn), then EMNX1 . . . Xn is determined by the class of plurality frames in
which every R ∈ R satisfies k(X1) to k(Xn). Or at least, we may suspect this to be
true for certain simple Xi and natural constraints such as those listed in Sect. 2. As it
turns out, however, that conjecture is wrong.
Schema (4), to recall, reads as follows:
(4) Kφ ⊃ K Kφ
It is straightforward to verify that every theorem of EMN4 is valid in every transitive
plurality frame. Given the result of the previous section, it suffices to show that (4) is
valid in all such frames. Suppose Mw Kφ. Then there is R ∈ R such that whenever
wRv, Mv φ. We need to show that there is R′ ∈ R such that for every v with wR′v,
there is R′′ ∈ R such that Mu φ whenever vR′′u. Setting R = R′ = R′′ will do: since
R is transitive, wRv and vRu entails wRu, and hence Mu φ by our assumption. It
follows that Mv Kφ and Mw K Kφ.
So far, so good. But EMN4 is not complete for the class of transitive plurality
frames. For that class validates (A*), which is not a theorem of EMN4:16
(A*) (Kφ ∧ K Kφ) ⊃ K (φ ∧ Kφ)
All instances of (A*) are also instances of (A), with ψ = Kφ. We can thus view
(A*) as a special case of closure under conjunction.
To show that (A*) is valid on the class of transitive frames, let R be transitive, and
suppose that w K (φ ∧ Kφ), and fix R ∈ R. Then there is w′ with wRw′ such that
w′ φ ∧ Kφ. Then w′ φ or w′ Kφ. If the former, there is w′ such that wRw′ and
w′ φ. If the latter, then, there is w′′ such that w′Rw′′ and w′′ φ. Since R is transitive,
wRw′′. Hence in either case, φ is false at some world R-accessible from w. Since R
was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that w Kφ, and hence w Kφ ∧ K Kφ.
16 This could be proved either by exploiting a completeness result for EMN4 relative to neighbourhood
frames, or else by exploiting our Theorem 5.2, below.
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We can, however, identify another class of plurality frames that does determine
EMN4. First we define a relation between relations:
Definition 5.1 R′ attributes R to R′′ in world w iff whenever wR′v and vR′′t , then
wRt .
Or equivalently in set-theoretic notation: R′ attributes R to R′′ in world w iff
R′ ◦ R′′(w) ⊆ R(w).
If the prime symbols are ignored, the right-hand side looks like it is saying that R
is transitive.
We can motivate the terminology by interpreting R, R′ and R′′ as encoding knowl-
edge of three compartments. If so, and if R′ attributes R to R′′ in the above sense, then
whenever the R compartment knows something, the R′ compartment knows that the
R′′ compartment knows it.
Theorem 5.1 (4) defines the class of frames in which for every w and R, there are R′
and R′′ such that R′ attributes R to R′′ in w.
Proof Suppose that the frame on which M is based satisfies the condition, and suppose
Mw Kφ. Then there is R ∈ R such that Mu φ whenever wRu. Pick R′ and R′′ such
that R′ attributes R to R′′ in w, and v such that wR′v. Then whenever vR′′u, wRu,
and thus Mu φ. Hence Mv Kφ and Mw K Kφ.
Suppose now that F does not satisfy the condition. Then for some w and R, there
are no R′ and R′′ such that R′ attributes R to R′′ in w. Consider a model M based on
F with I (0) = {v : wRv}. Then Mw K P0. But for any R′ and R′′, there are v and u
such that wR′v and vR′′u, but not wRu. Then Mu P0, and hence Mw K K P0. unionsq
We shall now define a further condition on plurality frames in terms of attribution:
Definition 5.2 R′ monitors R in w iff R′ attributes R to R; a frame F = 〈W ,R〉 is
monitored iff for every R ∈ R there is R′ ∈ R that monitors R in every w ∈ W .
In set-theoretic notation: R′ monitors R in w iff R′ ◦ R(w) ⊆ R(w). Note that
every transitive relation monitors itself, and that every transitive plurality frame is
thus monitored.
Theorem 5.2 EMN4 is determined by the class of all monitored plurality frames.
Proof Soundness follows from Theorem 5.1. For completeness, it is enough to show
that the frame of the canonical model of EMN4 is monitored. Let Rφ ∈ R, and let w
be any world. Suppose vRφ t but not wRφ t . Then since not wRφ t , Kφ ∈ w and φ /∈ t .
Since vRφ t and φ /∈ t , Kφ /∈ v. As an instance of (4), Kφ ⊃ K Kφ ∈ w, and since w
is closed under MP, K Kφ ∈ w. Hence not wRKφv. Since w was arbitrary, this shows
that RKφ monitors Rφ ; and since Rφ was arbitrary, the frame is monitored. unionsq
6 EMNB and symmetry
In the last section, we saw that requiring all relations in the plurality frames to be tran-
sitive guarantees the validity of (4), but is stronger than needed for that purpose—(4)
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does not define that condition—and also validates non-theorems of EMN4. Consider
now principle (B):
(B) ∼K∼Kφ ⊃ φ
In Kripke semantics, its corresponding condition is symmetry. But while requiring
all relations to be transitive gave us more than (4), in a certain sense, requiring all
relations to be symmetrical gives us less than (B) in plurality semantics, as we are
about to show.
As it turns out, MPC is an admissible rule in EMNB. This has been shown syntac-
tically (Jennings 1981; Humberstone 2015, pp. 181–182), but in the present context it
is instructive to appeal to plurality frames in our argument.
Say that F is quasi-symmetrical iff for every w ∈ W , there is R ∈ R such that
for all R′ ∈ R and v ∈ W , if wRv then vR′w. Less formally: at every world there
is a compartment R that only relates w to worlds in which no compartment has any
potential knowledge that rules out w.
Theorem 6.1 (B) is valid in the class of quasi-symmetrical frames.
Proof Suppose that Mw φ. Since R is quasi-symmetrical, there is R ∈ R such that
for all R′ ∈ R and v ∈ W , if wRv then vR′w. Let v be any world such that wRv.
Then, since vR′w for every R′ ∈ R, and since Mw φ, Mv Kφ. Since v was arbitrary,
Mw K∼Kφ, and hence Mw ∼K∼Kφ. unionsq
We can also show the other half of the definability result:
Theorem 6.2 If a frame is not quasi-symmetrical, (B) is not valid on it.
Proof Suppose that F is not quasi-symmetrical. Then there is w ∈ W such that for
every R ∈ R, there is R′ ∈ R and v ∈ W such that wRv and not vR′w. Let M be
a model on F with I (0) = {w}. Then Mw P0 and thus Mw ∼ P0. Pick such R ∈ R,
and R′ and v. Since not vR′w, Mv K ∼ P0 and thus Mv ∼ K ∼ P0. Since R was
arbitrary, Mw ∼ K ∼ K ∼ P0. unionsq
So the class of quasi-symmetrical frames is the largest one with respect to which
EMNB is sound. So if EMNB is complete with respect to any class of plurality frames,
it is complete with respect to the class of quasi-symmetrical ones. The next theorem
shows that it is.
Theorem 6.3 EMNB is complete for the class of quasi-symmetrical plurality frames.
Proof Let M = 〈W ,R, I 〉 be the canonical model of EMNB. Define M′ =
〈W ,R′, I 〉, where R′ = R ∪ {R∗}, where R∗ = {〈w, v〉 : φ ∈ w whenever Kφ ∈ v},
or equivalently, {〈w, v〉 : ∼K∼φ ∈ v whenever φ ∈ w}. We need to show two things:
(i) M and M′ are pointwise equivalent. (ii) M′ is quasi-symmetrical.
(i) The inductive steps for the propositional connectives are straightforward. Suppose
M′w Kφ. Then there is R ∈ R′ such that M′v φ for all v with wRv. If R ∈
R, then the induction hypothesis gives us Mw Kφ. So suppose that R = R∗.
Then M′v φ for all v with wR∗v. By the induction hypothesis, φ ∈ v for all
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v with wR∗v. Then {∼K∼ψ : ψ ∈ w} ∪ {¬φ} is EMNB-inconsistent. Hence
for some ψ1, . . . ψn ∈ w, EMNB (∼K∼ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∼K∼ψn) ⊃ φ. By SPC,
EMNB K (∼K∼ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∼K∼ψn) ⊃ Kφ.
We now show that K (∼K∼ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∼K∼ψn) ∈ w. Since by hypothesis,
ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ w, it is enough to show that EMNB ψ1 ∧· · ·∧ψn ⊃ K (∼K∼ψ1 ∧
· · ·∧∼K∼ψn). Clearly, EMNB ψ1∧· · ·∧ψn ⊃ K∼K∼(ψ1∧· · ·∧ψn). Further,
∼K∼(ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn) ⊃ ∼K∼ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∼K∼ψn is a theorem of EMN, and
hence of EMNB. Since EMNB admits SPC, EMNB K (∼K∼(ψ1 ∧· · ·∧ψn)) ⊃
K (∼K∼ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∼K∼ψn). By the closure of EMNB under propositional-
logical consequence, the desired consequence follows.
Hence Kφ ∈ w. Then Mw Kφ, by Theorem 4.5.
(ii) Let w be any element of W , and suppose that wR∗v for some v ∈ W . Let φ be
any sentence of L. If Kφ /∈ v, then vRφw. If Kφ ∈ v, then since wR∗v, φ ∈ w,
and hence vRφw. This shows that vRφw. It remains to show that vR∗w. Suppose
φ /∈ v. Then K∼Kφ ∈ v by (i). Since wR∗v, ∼Kφ ∈ w, and hence Kφ /∈ w, as
desired. unionsq
Corollary 1 EMNB is detemined by the class of quasi-symmetrical frames.
We can now show that EMNB admits multi-premise closure, i.e. that EMNB = KB.
Suppose frame F = 〈W ,R〉 is quasi-symmetrical, and pick w ∈ W and R, R′ ∈ R.
By quasi-symmetry, there is Rw ∈ R such that for all v and R′′, if wRwv then vR′′w.
Pick v such that wRwv. By quasi-symmetry again, there is Rv ∈ R such that for all
u and R′′, if vRvu then u R′′v. Then vRvw, and hence wR′′v for every R′′ ∈ R, in
particular R and R′. This shows that F is sub-closed. By Theorem 4.6, (A) holds in
F ; and by Theorem 6.3, (A) is a theorem of EMNB. Our earlier observations then
entail that EMNB admits MPC.
However, we can easily construct plurality frames in which every relation is
symmetrical, but which are not sub-closed. (A frame with three worlds will do,
R = {R, R′}, R symmetrically relating one pair of worlds, and R′ symmetrically
relating another pair of worlds.) We know from Theorem 4.6 that there are models
based on such frames where (A) fails. Given the result of the previous paragraph, it
follows that (B) fails in some symmetrical plurality frames.17
We may also note that (B) is entailed by (T) together with (5):
(5) ∼Kφ ⊃ K∼Kφ
It thus follows that EMNT5 is KT5.
In the absence of (T), (5) does not restore multi-premise closure, however. To verify
this, consider a model with just two worlds, one where P0 is true (wP ) and one where
P0 is false (wP ). Relation R relates both worlds to wP , and no others, and relation
R′ relates both worlds to wP , and no others; and there are no further relations. Then
K P0 ∧ K∼P0 ⊃ K (P0 ∧ ∼P0) fails at both wP and wP .
However, we can check that every instance of (5) holds in every world in that model.
In this model, every proposition is either equivalent to , P0, ¬P0, or ⊥. Of the four,
17 The variable margin frames that Williamson (1994) uses to model the logic of clarity are in effect
symmetrical plurality frames which validate (A) but not (B).
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the only one such that ∼Kφ is true at some world is ⊥; indeed, ∼K⊥ is equivalent
to . But the semantics ensures that K holds, and hence the consequent of (5) for
such an instance.
We may further note that various extensions of EMN4 do not admit MPC. Consider
a plurality frame with W = {w, v, u}, R = {R, R′}, where R is the smallest reflexive
and symmetrical relation that holds between w and v, and R′ is the smallest reflexive
and symmetrical relation that holds between w and u. It can be verified—although we
shall not do it here—that every instance of (4), (T), (0.2), (0.3), and (0.4) is valid on
that frame. From among the candidate principles listed earlier, only (A), (B), and (5)
may fail in models based on that frame. This illustrates that epistemic logics which do
not admit MPC may still be quite strong in other respects.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have set out two rather different motivations for rejecting a multiple
premise closure principle for knowledge. The first of these appeals to the idea that
knowledge requires minimising, but not eliminating, the risk of falsity, while the
second appeals to the idea that knowers may be compartmentalised in their thinking.
We have described a series of epistemic logics in which closure fails and set out
two semantic approaches to these logics—neighbourhood and plurality semantics—
which naturally correspond to the two motivations for rejecting closure. As plurality
semantics is the less familiar approach, we have offered a more thorough formal
exploration of this framework, investigating its links with neighbourhood and Kripke
semantics, and outlining how it can deliver some of the best known principles of
epistemic logic.
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